Referential Opacity and Inferential Fertility

Informing is referentially opaque. Referential opacity pertains to the fact that while an audience may well understand what a proposition means, they may not realise what or whom it is about (Manson & O'Neill 2007, p. 45). Thus, when making a successful communicative transaction, we need to focus on more than the content at face value: we need to take into account the beliefs of the participants. An example is covered in section 2.1.2, where a user is expected to know whether various legal statements apply within their jurisdiction. This is quite often the case with current EULAs, where users may not think a particular part of an agreement pertains to them.

Communication, by its nature, allows people to make many inferences, and in many cases depends on this inference-making nature to work successfully (Manson & O'Neill 2007, p. 46). If a user is told a particular fact about a program, such as ``the program lets you send email'', then the user makes certain inferences about the program, such as that it must therefore need some sort of internet connection, or that it can send pictures, all of which are based on a set of expectations of that user. The user, whether consciously or unconsciously, will continue on to make a wide range of inferences, including those which may not necessarily follow (such as that maybe the program will also have an address book, which it may not). This inferential fertility illustrates the importance of careful statements that allow little room for different interpretations and acknowledgement of normative expectations.